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Culver v. Gorman & Co.

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

In this case the plaintiff was employed by the defendant and fired three days after speaking of a discrimination charge or seeking a lawyer based on discrimination she encountered while working for the defendant. Summary judgment was granted on behalf of the defendant on the basis that the suspicious timing of her termination was not enough to create a triable issue. On appeal the summary judgment was reversed.

In short, the plaintiff was employed for the defendant as an assistant property manager responsible for leasing apartments and handling resident accounts and concerns. Her work responsibilities increased prompting her to request a pay raise. After receiving a minimal pay raise she was talking to two male maintenance workers who had received much larger raises in the past and currently. She recently had a job performance evaluation that said she met or exceeded expectations in all areas of her job but was told the following year's budget was set and a higher raise would not be available. She complained to co-workers about the discrimination and the idea of seeking a lawyer to file a complaint. Three days later she was fired with her supervisor stating her attitude changed dramatically in those three days. Plaintiff brought suit seeking voluntary injunctive relief stating she had been terminated for threatening to bring a sex discrimination suit. While the trial court only relied upon the suspicious timing they stated aside from all the other evidence suspicious timing was not enough and granted summary judgment.

Under an unlawful retaliation suit the plaintiff must prove: 1) she engaged in such protected expression; 2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and 3) there was a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse action. The only element in issue in this case is the third element of the causal link. Causal link may be established by showing that her protected conduct was a substantial motivating factor in the employer's decision. It is a factor that may only be a factor that motivated the defendant's actions and does not amount to the only factor. In this case, a direct method of proving the causal link was utilized. Direct evidence requires an admission by the decision maker that they were based on the prohibited conduct where circumstantial evidence may also be utilized. As such, the temporal proximity of the firing and the timing of her complaints rise to the level of circumstantial evidence enough to keep the action alive. Therefore, where the trial court ruled the suspicious timing was not enough it can be enough if sufficient other evidence exists. While the case does not examine to what level additional evidence will support defeating a summary judgment, it does indicate statements made by the defendant that certain actions will advise or were constantly sufficient to establish some ill manner by the defendant.

In support of their motion for summary judgment the defendant relied upon the employee's record or reason for firing - in this case insubordination. The court basically ruled that this was an issue for the jury to hash out and the court would not serve as a "super personnel review board" to second guess or evaluate the legitimacy of business decisions. Therefore, there was enough for the jury to consider the issue at hand and summary judgment was not appropriate. When insubordinate behavior is alleged as a reason for firing, the basic test is whether the defendant honestly believed that the plaintiff's actions were insubordinate. If the termination due to insubordination was not pre-textual or honestly believed then the plaintiff may survive summary judgment.

Racioct v. Wal-Mart

Seventh Circuit appellate decision regarding claims for sex discrimination, sexual harassment, age harassment and retaliation

This appeal was filed by the Plaintiff after the district court granted the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in her claim of sex discrimination, sexual harassment and retaliation against defendant. Plaintiff claims that two co-workers made derogatory comments regarding her, yelled at her, interfered with her work and vacation schedule and often used foul language in her presence. In November 2000 one of the offenders was terminated after a customer overhead him calling the plaintiff a "fucking bitch". Plaintiff met with both the store manager and the district manager to address her concerns regarding the incident. Also in November 2000 plaintiff was reprimanded for holding back discounted meat and selling it to her husband. In December 2000 she was suspected of mislabeling or underring seafood. In a written statement, plaintiff admitted to attempting to sell seafood at a discounted price but changed her mind at the last minute. As a result of the two incidents, the plaintiff was terminated and replaced with an individual older than her.

The court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment on the sex discrimination claim as it was time barred. The plaintiff had only 300 days in which to file her claim. The incidents described by her happened before April 2000, her claim was not filed until May 21, 2001.

As to the sexual harassment claim, the court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment based on the fact that the plaintiff was unable to show the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. There were only a limited number of incidents and the court felt it was more a matter of uncouth behavior.

Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in the age harassment case as the plaintiff failed to show that she was actually terminated due to her age. Plaintiff only claims that co-workers made comments regarding her age. Also, the plaintiff was replaced by an employee older than her.

As for the retaliation claim, the court found that the defendant had terminated the plaintiff for being involved in two incidents which were against their code of conduct. Neither incident had anything to do with her claims against the co-workers however, were caused by her own actions.

Reschny v. Elk Grove Plating Co.

Plaintiff claims she was sexually harassed by supervisors and sought a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She retained an attorney to represent her interests. The EEOC sent a notice of right to sue letter to her attorney but not to the plaintiff herself. The Post Office returned the notice to the EEOC because her attorney's firm had closed for business due to bankruptcy and abandoned her representation. As such, a year and a half later she contacted the EEOC to determine the status of her claim and they notified her of these events. Defendant moved for summary judgment. The court granted defendant's motion. On appeal the court deemed the summary judgment appropriate and the plaintiff's case was barred by the statute of limitations.

There are two types of receipt of notice which can start the 90 day statute of limitations for filing suits pursuant to a right to sue letter. The first is actual receipt by the plaintiff and the second is actual receipt by the plaintiff's attorney otherwise known as constructive receipt by the plaintiff. When notice is delayed by fault of the plaintiff constructive receipt doctrine applies. Here the court deemed the delay was at the fault of the plaintiff because she knew of her attorney's actions and failed to take action until a year and a half later. Moreover, she moved in the process and failed to update her address with the EEOC and could not remember in deposition whether she even filled out a change of address form with the Post Office. Therefore, the court deemed her actions in addition to her attorney's actions constitute plaintiff's fault and the 90 days tolled. Therefore her case could not survive summary judgment on this issue.